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The world has a shortage of financial assets. Asset supply is having a hard time keeping up with the
global demand for store of value and collateral by households, corporations, governments, insurance
companies, and financial intermediaries more broadly. The equilibrium response of asset prices and
valuations to these shortages has played a central role in global economic developments over the last
twenty years. The so-called "global imbalances," the recurrent emergence of speculative bubbles (which
recently have transited from emerging markets, to the dot-coms, to real estate, to gold...), the historically
low real interest rates and associated "interest-rate conundrum," and even the widespread low inflation









The world has a shortage of ﬁnancial assets. Asset supply i sh a v i n gah a r d
time keeping up with the global demand for store of value and collateral by
households, corporations, governments, insurance companies, and ﬁnancial
intermediaries more broadly. In equilibrium, the value of the (relatively)
few existing assets must rise, which has important global macroeconomic
implications.
These shortages have been a perennial problem in emerging markets,
where many of their economic perils and idiosyncrasies stem from this fea-
ture. But we are now seeing a shortage on a global scale. It probably began
with the meltdown of a substantial share of Japanese assets in the early
1990s, it was exacerbated by European stagnation and the collective emerg-
ing market crises of the late 1990s, and it consolidated in the new millennium
by the fast income growth of China and commodity countries, most of which
have substantial asset demand needs but are not natural asset producers.
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, there are microeconomic factors
contributing to these shortages. In particular, the recent rapid pace of ﬁ-
nancial development has facilitated restructuring, innovation and economic
growth, but because of their margin requirements they may well have been
a net collateral consuming activity, at least in the short run.
The equilibrium response of asset prices and valuations to these short-
ages has played a central role in global economic developments over the last
twenty years. The so-called “global imbalances,” the recurrent emergence of
speculative bubbles (which recently have transited from emerging markets,
to the dot-coms, to real estate, to gold...), the historically low real interest
rates and associated “interest-rate conundrum,” and even the widespread low
inﬂation environment and deﬂationary episodes in parts of the world, all fall
into place once one adopts this asset shortage perspective.
Understanding the source of these developments as asset supply short-
ages informs optimal policy responses. The policy prescriptions that follow
from this view are a mixture of conventional advice, with an emphasis on ﬁ-
nancial development and incentive preservation in capital markets, and more
adventurous recommendations. In particular, since speculative bubbles are
a necessary evil in this environment, it is important to learn to manage
their risks rather than to obsess over choking them. By extension, the same
recommendations apply to concerns about global imbalances and over the
excess-liquidity consequences of low interest rate policies.
2In these notes I sketch the essence of this view and of the main policy
recommendations that follow from it. However, these are largely uncharted
waters. My discussion has plenty of conjectures anchored by spotty academic
work. Much of the research needed to understand what got us to this point,
how to manage a global economy of this nature, and ultimately how to grow
out it, if this is perceived to be necessary, lies ahead.
This introduction is followed by four short sections. Section 2 sketches the
macroeconomic consequences and policy lessons of endemic asset shortages
in emerging market economies. Section 3 discusses the global counterpart,
where equilibrium considerations play a central role, and argues that low
interest rates and inﬂation rates, as well as high (speculative) valuations, are
all market-based mechanism to rebuild asset supply. It also warns on the
deﬂationary consequences of chasing bubbles, and proposes instead to focus
on the risk management of high valuation equilibria. Section 4 discusses the
role of a lender of last resort in reducing net collateral demand. Section 5
concludes and is followed by a short appendix.
2E m e r g i n g M a r k e t s
It is useful to start the discussion with emerging markets for three reasons.
First, their experience informs the issue since their chronic asset shortage
is an integral component of their macroeconomic performance and manage-
ment. Second, there is a tendency to extrapolate directly these countries’
lessons to the current global imbalances. While this is sound in some dimen-
sions, it is not in others. It is important to understand which one is which.
Third, the coordinated crises of emerging markets in the late 1990s, as well
as their fast growth in recent years, have played a central role in generat-
ing the current worldwide shortage of assets, and hence are at the core of
understanding world equilibrium.
2.1 Asset shortages and bubbles
If we could ignore capital market frictions of all sorts, emerging market
economies would borrow massive amounts from the rest of the world, both
to build the stock of capital required to catch up with developed economies
and to smooth consumption intertemporally. However, this description does
not ﬁt these economies’ reality. Not only is their international borrowing lim-
3ited, but they also experience chronic capital outﬂows from residents, ranging
from households to central banks, seeking to store value in safer locations.
In short, emerging market economies are not able to produce the ﬁnancial
assets demanded by local agents to store value.
The reasons for asset supply shortages in these economies come from a
variety of microeconomic, macroeconomic, and political deﬁciencies. Weak
bankruptcy procedures, chronic macroeconomic volatility, and sheer expro-
priation risk reduce the value and safety of local assets.
However, there is a latent tension between the potentially high marginal
product of physical investment in these economies and the relatively low
returns obtained from safer external assets. This gap creates both an a t u r a l
source of speculative bubbles (by which I mean assets held primarily for their
potential capital gains rather than for their dividends) and a potentially
useful role for them. Therei sas o r to fd y n a m i ci n e ﬃciency. If domestic
agents succeed in coordinating their investments in some local assets, their
capital repatriation can lead to higher returns to those that choose to store
value in local assets. This path is rational (potentially sustainable) because
of the gap in returns. In turn, these additional resources relax ﬁnancial
constraints and facilitate domestic growth. Again, it is the gap in returns
that makes this strategy potentially welfare improving.
Real estate, and land in particular, are among the assets with best de-
ﬁned property rights in many of these economies and therefore become the
initial focus of attention. Corporate assets from the bellwether companies of
the country follow behind. Eventually, the large asset appreciations attract
foreign investors who further fuel local speculation.
Not all is virtuous in the bubbly equilibrium, however. There is an inher-
ent macroeconomic fragility in coordination-dependent speculative booms.
In the same way as these start, investors’ moods can change rapidly, caus-
ing an implosion in local asset values and widespread international liquidity
scarcity as the savings that once were stored in safe heavens are now deployed
in riskier local assets, and there is a surge in capital outﬂows for those that
can still do it.
2.2 Policy considerations
What should the local authorities do in dealing with such an environment?
In particular, should they prevent the emergence of local bubbles altogether,
or should they, on the contrary, wait until after a crash has taken place to in-
4tervene? These are the questions we address in Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001, 2006a).
It turns out that the same ﬁnancial underdevelopment that limits the
number of assets produced by the economy and gives value to bubbles, biases
the private sector incentive toward undertaking an excessive number of risky
investments.1 In this context, once domestic bubbles develop, the private
sector reallocates too many resources toward them, overexposing the economy
to a deep crash.
This excessive risk taking justiﬁes intervention. An important question
is whether policies should focus on preventing excessive risk taking or on im-
proving the handling of a crisis should one occur. While optimal policy typ-
ically involves elements of both, the optimal package overweights prevention
in emerging markets (relative to developed economies) since the government
has limited options once in a crisis, as it often ﬁnds itself involved in the
turmoil and deprived of credit.2
There are two broad categories of potential policy interventions. Those
that address the excessive risk taking but not the underlying shortage of
sound assets, and those that address the shortage itself. Among the former
a r em e a s u r e ss u c ha si m p o s i n gl i q u i d i t yr a t i o so nﬁnancial intermediaries or
sterilizing capital inﬂows. However, these are not free of their own limita-
tions. The former policy requires the ability to monitor ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, whose individual incentives to go around the system and take excessive
risks rise as competitors are bound by regulation. The latter policy is costly
for the government and requires that it has suﬃcient credibility to create a
large amount of ﬁnancial assets, which is often a constraint. More impor-
tantly, neither of these policies addresses the fundamental shortage of assets
and, worse, they risk exacerbating the problem if overdone.
Monetary policy can also be used as an incentive (rather than as a pal-
liative) mechanism. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005), we show that
1When a domestic investor decides to bring back some of its resources stored abroad
(or borrow from foreigners) to speculate in localm a r k e t s ,i ti n c r e a s e st h es y s t e m i cr i s ki n
the event of a crash. If domestic ﬁnancial markets are well developed, and hence borrowers
can credibly pledge much of their future earnings to lenders and investors, the investor
internalizes the value of hoarding safe resources for a potential crash. In contrast, if domes-
tic ﬁnancial markets are underdeveloped, the ex-post arbitrage opportunities are limited
since existing assets can only capitalize a small share of the return from the additional
resources.
2A theme I do not develop here is what should the government do with the resources
it chooses to store for precautionary reasons (see e.g. Caballero and Panageas (2005)).
5by modifying the inﬂation targeting rule so that it automatically rewards
prudent behavior in the event of a crash, monetary policy improves private
sector risk management practices. This can be done, for example, by hav-
ing an explicit rule that overweights nontradables, so that the private sector
anticipates that the central bank will let the exchange rate ﬂuctuate more
freely in the event of a crisis, and hence discourages excessive reallocation
from dollar-assets to speculative peso assets. However, this strategy may
also backﬁre if domestic derivative markets are limited, and the additional
exchange rate volatility depresses non-speculative investment and domestic
intermediation. Moreover, there is some circularity in the problem, since
well-functioning derivative markets require collateral assets, but it is their
scarcity that is the root problem behind the fragility monetary policy is
seeking to alleviate.
Ultimately, the long term solution to the problem is ﬁnancial develop-
ment, as sound assets crowd out the reason for the emergence of speculative
bubbles. If the government has enough taxation credibility, then it should be-
gin by developing the domestic public bond market. Absent this credibility,
public debt is just another speculative bubble.
3 The World Economy
For a variety of reasons, many of which I mentioned in the introduction, as
of late the world has been experiencing a situation in which assets are in
short supply. In essence, globalization spreads the shortages from speciﬁc
regions to the world at large. While many of the elements of the analysis
in the previous section extend to this context, there are two key diﬀerences
and considerations. First, not all regions of the world are equal in their
ability to supply ﬁnancial assets, and hence the global shortage of assets
leads to large capital gains and ﬂows toward the asset-producing regions of
the world. Second, an important factor behind the signiﬁcant potential for
crises in emerging markets is the existence of a large number of assets that
can substitute for local assets at a moment’s notice. This is not the case
for the world as a whole or for a large economy like the US. These are the
themes we develop in Caballero et al (2006a) and, in particular, in Caballero
et al (2006b).
63.1 Global imbalances and low interest rates
The starting point of the analysis is the observation, already present in the
previous section, that capital’s ability to produce output is only imperfectly
linked to its ability to generate assets. A higher capacity to produce output
makes the underlying capital more valuable, but the possibility to sell the
rights over that output in advance, and hence to create an asset from it,
d e p e n d so nas e r i e so fi n s t i t u t i o n a lf a c t o r st h a tv a r yw i d e l ya c r o s st h ew o r l d .
On one end, developed Anglo-Saxon economies, and the US in particu-
lar, have managed to combine good growth conditions with an unmatched
ability to generate sound and liquid ﬁnancial assets appealing to global in-
vestors and savers. On the other end, emerging market and oil-producing
economies have seen large increases in their disposable income, but remain
largely unable to generate an adequate supply of good quality assets. Lastly,
continental Europe and Japan have been hampered by limited growth and
by lagging behind the Anglo-Saxon economies in terms of their ability to
produce ﬁnancial assets.
Other things equal, such conﬁguration leads naturally to the so-called
“global imbalances,” as the Anglo-Saxons supply ﬁnancial assets to the rest
of the world and experience current account deﬁcits as an unavoidable coun-
terpart. These “imbalances” can go on for a long time and are exacerbated
by the rapid growth of China and emerging markets more broadly. Moreover,
it turns out that “other things” are not equal, and they tend to reinforce the
direction of ﬂows, as a series of demographic and precautionary motives have
increased the demand for assets in the global economy.
Much has been said about China’s policy of international reserves accu-
mulation and its responsibility for global imbalances. Some of this concern
may be justiﬁed, but I believe this to be a second-order issue. Ultimately,
China is a fast-growing economy with ever-increasing demand for store of
value instruments, which its economy is largely unable to generate at the
moment. If China had an open capital account, its citizens would seek these
assets abroad directly. Since it does not, it is the government that accu-
mulates the international assets and instead issues implicitly collateralized
sterilization bonds to its citizens. Unlike the typical sterilization episode,
these bonds yield very low returns, which simply reﬂects the excess demand
for store of value they partially satisfy.
The shortage of assets also helps explain the secular decline in long-run
real interest rates over the last decade, despite occasional eﬀorts from central
7banks around the world to raise them (recall the interest rate conundrum).
While central banks may be able to control short rates, the long rates are
kept low by the high valuation of scarce assets.
These secular forces behind low real interest rates and large net capi-
tal ﬂows toward the Anglo-Saxon economies are occasionally interrupted by
speculative episodes which raise local asset values in emerging markets. This
is the mechanism described in the previous section. The emerging market
crises of the late 1990s corresponded to an abrupt and systemic end of one
such episode. The result was a massive rise in capital ﬂows to the US and
a sharp decline in safe interest rates. In fact it does not seem unreasonable
to conjecture that some of the dot-coms bubble in the US resulted from that
rapid reallocation. By the same token, the crash in the real estate and stock
markets in Japan in the late 1980s was probably an important factor behind
the US current account deﬁcits that began to build in the early 1990s.
In summary, endogenous real interest rate drops are market-mechanisms
to raise the value of existing assets and therefore replace some of the lost
assets after a crash, and to cover part of the asset shortage created by secular
forces.
3.2 Speculative bubbles and low inﬂation
The emergence of speculative bubbles and a drop in inﬂation (perhaps into
ad e ﬂation), are yet two other market mechanisms to bridge the asset gap.
For reasons similar to those discussed in the emerging markets section,
in a world with substantial asset shortages speculative bubbles are not only
likely to arise, but also provide an important service to those seeking to
store value. In fact, in Caballero et al (2006a), we show that under certain
conditions, bubbles must exist.3 That is, in the absence of a speculative
bubble, there is an excess demand for ﬁnancial assets and a corresponding
excess supply of goods (see the appendix).
The conditions for the must-have-bubbles result are natural within an
environment in which assets are in short supply. All that is needed is that
the rents accruing to assets currently traded are expected to decline over
time relative to the size of the economy (but not too fast).4 For example, it
3Note that this is never the case for a single emerging market economy, since in that
case there are many substitute assets.
4The reason these conditions ensure a bubble is that they put an upper bound on the
present value of fundamentals (rents), which under the right assumptions is not enough
8seems sensible to expect that rents from currently owned land are not likely
to keep up with the economy’s rate of growth for the indeﬁnite future. Note
that these are conditions for fully rational bubbles to exist. It is not that
I beleive that speculative bubbles are always of this nature. The point is
that if the world is in a situation where even fully rational bubbles could be
justiﬁed (or nearly so), we should not be at all surprised that speculative
bubbles (rational or not) take hold so easily.
In reality, agents’ portfolios also contain nominal assets issued by the gov-
ernment. This addition gives the economy another adjustment mechanism,
since a change in the price level aﬀects the real value of these assets. On the
face of an asset shortage, a drop in inﬂa t i o no ra no u t r i g h td e ﬂation when the
shortage is due to a crash in asset values, is a market mechanism to revalue
nominal assets and help covering the asset-gap.
3.3 Policy implications
T h ew a yo u to ft h ec u r r e n tj u n c t u r ei su l t i m a t e l yo n eo fﬁnancial devel-
opment in the regions of the world that have limited capacity to generate
store-of-value instruments relative to their demands.5 Financial development
also reduces the incentive and space for ineﬃcient risk-shifting in emerging
markets.
But this process of ﬁnancial development is slow. In the meantime, the
world must learn to operate in a high-valuations environment. Failing to un-
derstand that some of the observed “anomalies” are symptoms and market-
based solutions can have dire consequences if policymakers start chasing bub-
bles, “global imbalances” and low real interest rates.
For instance, if the government attempts to and succeeds at bursting
an equilibrium bubble, the immediate impact of destroying these assets is
to satisfy the demand for assets in the economy. The gap must be ﬁlled by a speculative
bubble. The question arises of why can’t the interest rate drop as much as it needs to
make the present value of fundamentals as large as is needed to satisfy asset demand. The
answer is again in the excess demand for store of value. As the economy grows, so does
its demand for assets, which ensures capital gains from selling assets in the future. These
capital gains mean that the rate of growth of the economy is a lower bound for equilibrium
interest rates, from which the upper bound on the present value of fundamentals follows
since rents are growing at a rate lower than the economy.
5Financial development is likely to operate on both ends, by increasing the supply of
assets and by reducing the demand for assets (precautionary savings).
9to create an excess demand for ﬁnancial assets and a corresponding excess
supply of goods. In the short run, the real interest may drop to zero if the
economy comes to a halt, but the relief from this adjustment is minor if
capitalizable dividends are small relative to the bubble they are supposed
to replace. The rest of the adjustment falls on the real value of nominal
assets. However, in reality the value of these assets is too small to oﬀset
as i g n i ﬁcant crash in asset values. For example, even a relatively minor
correction such as that experienced by the US stock market at the beginning
of the millennia is about twice the size of all the nominal liabilities issued by
the U.S. government and held by the private sector. Reasonable increases
in the supply of these assets will not suﬃce, and a sharp decline in the
price level becomes the main escape valve of the economy. Complementing
this environment with price inertia and a Phillips curve naturally yields a
protracted and costly deﬂationary episode while the economy waits for the
Pigou-mechanism to make up for the lost assets.6
Instead, policies should focus on managing the risks associated to high
valuation equilibria. There are two main dimensions along which speculative
equilibria bring about risks: Aggregate and location. The former refers to
the size of the collection of all speculative valuations in the economy. It
turns out that inﬂation targeting should suﬃce to control excessive bubbles
at the aggregate level. If valuations grow too much, then the economy enters
a region of excess supply of assets and excess demand for goods; inﬂationary
pressures build and hence automatically trigger monetary policy tightening.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, the same argument does not apply for
deﬂationary pressures as crashes are often more abrupt than booms. The
good news is that if speculative valuations are the result of a shortage of
assets, then they are likely to be less prone to crashes absent some strange
shock or misguided policy intervention.
Note, however, that while the value of the aggregate bubble is pinned
down, there is nothing that determines its location. This observation hints
at several policy conclusions: First, chasing a bubble in an asset-shortage
environment is likely to move it around rather than eliminate it in the ag-
gregate. This can be costly, as it forces the economy to experience crashes
and disruptive reallocations without the reward of a more stable bubbleless
economy. Second, monetary policy is not a good instrument to address lo-
6Moreover, the sharp contraction associated to this mechanism is likely to reduce the
value of real assets, exacerbating the required reﬂation of nominal assets.
10cation problems. These must be dealt with more sector/investment speciﬁc
instruments, perhaps in the form of a combination of policy induced caps
and backing. Third, since high valuations must develop, it is better that
they take place in non-resource consuming activities. In this sense, bubbles
on land and gold are better than a speculative boom on some industrial
activity.7 Although the ideal is probably that the bubble spreads across a
wide variety of assets, thus reducing the cost-impact on sectors that use land,
commodities, etc., as inputs of production. Fourth, taking the previous ar-
gument to the limit, the impact of loose monetary policy on intermediaries’
lending practices has the virtue of creating multiple bubbly assets and hence
preventing excessive concentration of bubbles. Of course this eﬀect must be
traded oﬀ against the more conventional risk-shifting concern. But the point
is that there is a trade-oﬀ, rather than just a bad eﬀect, as it would be in an
environment without an asset shortage.
I ns u m m a r y ,t h ep o l i c yc o n c l u s i o ni st h a ti na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t ha s s e t
shortages, it is important to recognize that speculative valuations are part of
the equilibrium. In this context, the best policy is to minimize the resource
misallocation they may cause and to protect their stability. The latter can
be achieved by fostering the spreading of the aggregate bubble across many
assets (i.e., foster an extensive rather than an intensive margin), by not
chasing them indiscriminately, and by providing some sort of implicit or
explicit backing to some of the speculative assets. The good news is that in
a world of low interest rates, even a pledge of a small share of the tax receipts
can back a large amount of assets, as long as the total revenue from these
taxes grows in tandem with the economy.
4 Economizing Assets: A Lender of Last Re-
sort
Financial intermediaries have signiﬁcant demands for store of value. How-
ever, in a world with limited asset supply, hoarding collateral assets is ex-
pensive. This encourages intermediaries to take larger risks by trimming the
backing of their ﬁnancial obligations.
There are limits on how much collateral-trimming is feasible and desir-
7I hesitate to describe the dot.com bubble as such, since in that case there were plenty of
technological externalities which may have oﬀset the privately wasted physical investment.
11able. If excessive, the risk of a systemic crisis rises and may trigger panics,
especially when agents are confused by Knightian uncertainty (which is of-
ten the case during ﬁnancial turmoil). Facing this risk, it is tempting for
ar e g u l a t o rt of o r c eﬁnancial intermediaries to increase their collateral posi-
tion. But this regulation can be costly if imposed in response to a situation
created by widespread scarcity of collateral assets. Of course this considera-
tion must be traded oﬀ against the standard risk-shifting and moral hazard
concerns. But the point is, again, that the scarcity of collateral assets es-
tablishes a meaningful trade-oﬀ and mechanically applying rules suitable for
other environments can be counterproductive.
The question arises whether there are more eﬃcient means of intervention
in this environment. This is the issue we address in Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2006b).
We show that when Knightian uncertainty is a concern and a source of
collateral freezing, a lender of last (not intermediate!) resort (LLR) can play
an eﬀective role even if it is less informed than the private sector. Moreover,
very little of the gain needs to come from the direct intervention of the LLR,
as the beneﬁt of the policy derives primarily from improved eﬃciency in the
use of private collateral.
T h er e a s o nt h eL L Rh a st h i sp o w e ri st h a ti te x p l o i t sacollective bias
in the implicit assessment of the probability of extreme aggregate events by
private agents. We show this result in a context where ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries understand the risks of their own market, but are uncertain about the
risks in other markets. In particular, they fear not being able to collect on
their claims if other markets are hit before theirs. In response to this uncer-
tainty, intermediaries demand for other intermediaries to fully collateralize
their contingent liabilities, which ineﬃciently locks scarce collateral assets.
The LLR may know less about each market than do intermediaries, but
it does know that it is impossible for all intermediaries to come out second in
t h ee v e n to fac r i s i s .T h i sk n o w l e d g ei se n o u g ht ol e v e r a g et h ev a l u eo faL L R
facility, as for any given level of resources pledged by the LLR, intermediaries
collectively magnify its value and free collateral accordingly.
5F i n a l r e m a r k s
In these notes I have argued that many of the main macroeconomic events of
the last two decades, both for developing and developed economies, can be
12understood by recognizing a powerful, yet largely ignored ingredient in the
analysis of these events: the world seems to have a severe shortage of assets.
This ingredient has positive and normative implications. Among the for-
mer, emerging market boom-bust cycles, global imbalances, low real interest
rates, deﬂationary episodes, recurrent bubbles, and ﬁnancial panics, all follow
naturally from this view.
As for policy, perhaps the main advice is the importance of recognizing
the source of these symptoms and the fact that some of them are simply
the market’s attempt to ﬁll the asset gap. In this context, knee-jerk reac-
tions to the emergence of speculative bubbles and global imbalances can be
counterproductive.
136 Appendix
The following OLG model illustrates a situation in which the economy must
have a bubble. Suppose that the ﬁnancial wealth of a country, W,i sc o m -
posed of the present value of rents, F, and a bubble, B.T h eﬂow counterpart
of F is a dividend f. Total output in the economy is made of these rents and
some endowment, totalling y and growing at a rate g. These goods are non-
storable and consumption is proportional to ﬁnancial wealth (hence, there is
a non-ricardian feature): ct = θWt.
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that:
θWt = yt
Now suppose that dividends grow a rate g−ρ<g , then, for a given sequence









w h e r et h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a ti nt h i se c o n o m yt h e
interest rate converges to g from above. To see this, note that the standard
arbitrage equation is:
rtWt = ft + ˙ Wt





Replacing W by its components and dividing by the propensity to con-
sume, we ﬁnd that:













It follows that if the share of income from rents is not too large, the economy
must have a bubble in equilibrium.
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